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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FIRST AMENDMENT-THIRD CIRCUIT
USE OF INJUNCTIONS TO RESTRICT ANTIABORTION PROTESTERS
Northeast Women's Center, Inc. v. McMonagle (1991)
I. INTRODUCTION
The debate over whether abortion is an exercise in self-determina-
tion or legally sanctioned murder has divided the country more than any
other issue in recent memory.' The issue involves a volatile combina-
tion of law and morality. Many typically law-abiding citizens have voiced
their moral beliefs with disregard for the law resulting in disruptive and
often violent public demonstrations. 2 As the Framers of the United
States Constitution anticipated, the citizens need a mechanism through
which to build coalitions and to effect change, even when voicing unpop-
ular opinions. 3 This mechanism is the First Amendment of the Consti-
tution which ensures that ideas, no matter how offensive, can be voiced
in the "public forum," and that the legal boundaries of issues can be
tested and shifted. 4 The United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit recently decided that in the exercise of these First Amendment
rights, if conduct during a protest crosses legal boundaries, protesters
may permanently have their First Amendment rights impaired in related
future acts of protest, expression and speech. 5
1. HYMAN RODMAN ET AL., THE ABORTION QUESTION 1-2 (1987) (stating that
abortion raises legal, moral, health and religious issues and "[s]ome families
have been torn apart by the controversy").
2. RAYMOND TATALOVICH & BYRON W. DAYNES, THE POLITICS OF ABORTION:
A STUDY OF COMMUNITY CONFLICT IN PUBLIC POLICY MAKING 165 (1981).
[Civil disobedience] has been a technique used more often by the pro-
life advocates than the pro-choice groups. Civil disobedience has al-
ways been an effective means to convey a message or idea. It is not
surprising to many that civil disobedience has been resorted to from
time to time in the abortion controversy. What is surprising is the form
this disobedience has often taken: bombings of abortion clinics, arson,
as well as sit-ins at clinics.
Id.
3. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-2, at 788 (2d
ed. 1988) (citing Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375, 377 (1927) (Brandeis,
J., joined by Holmes, J., concurring) (stating that freedom of speech is a "means
indispensable to the discovery and spread of political truth" and to "political
change")).
4. The First Amendment states:
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assem-
ble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
5. Northeast Women's Ctr., Inc. v. McMonagle, 939 F.2d 57 (3d Cir. 1991)
[hereinafter McMonagle II]. This decision is the most recent decision stemming
(978)
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Northeast Women's Center, Inc. v. McMonagle (McMonagle II) is the first
case in which the Third Circuit considered the First Amendment protec-
tions afforded to protesters and the concomitant protections afforded to
those parties targeted by the protesters. 6 The court relied on a fifty-
year-old and infrequently used United States Supreme Court case, Milk
Wagon Drivers Union, Local 753 v. Meadowmoor Dairies,7 to carve out an
from a case initially heard in 1985, Northeast Women's Ctr., Inc. v. McMonagle,
624 F. Supp. 736 (E.D. Pa. 1985). The prior Third Circuit holding in this case,
which attracted a great deal of attention, including scholarly review, involved the
conviction of 13 abortion activists under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. § 1961. Northeast Women's Ctr., Inc. v.
McMonagle, 868 F.2d 1342 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 901 (1989) [hereinaf-
ter McMonagle 1]. As a result of the prior convictions, a permanent injunction
was issued against the protesters and those who "participate in non-peaceful
activity through the defendants' invitation." Northeast Women's Ctr., Inc. v.
McMonagle, 745 F. Supp. 1082, 1094 (E.D. Pa. 1990). The permanent injunc-
tion was later modified for clarification of its terms. Northeast Women's Ctr.,
Inc. v. McMonagle, 749 F. Supp. 695 (E.D. Pa. 1990). The subsequent appeal of
the modified injunction is the focus of this most recent decision. McMonagle II,
939 F.2d at 59.
Speech can be "abridged" by the government in two ways. TRIBE, supra
note 3, § 12-2, at 789. The government can attempt to restrict the content of
the speech, or it can regulate the methods by which the speech is conveyed,
irrespective of content. Id. McMonagle II involved the latter type of restriction,
centering on the methods of conveyance and the conduct surrounding expres-
sion and speech. McMonagle 11, 939 F.2d at 62. In this area, the Supreme Court
has established a right of governments to restrict speech in terms of its time,
place and manner. See Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474 (1988). Commentators
have noted that "[s]uch restrictions encompass a broad spectrum of limitations
on expressive activity, ranging, for example, from a prohibition on the use of
loudspeakers, to a ban on billboards, to a limitation on campaign contributions,
to a prohibition on the mutilation of draft cards." GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL.,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 1257 (2d ed. 1991). The general foundation for these re-
strictions was first discussed by the Supreme Court in Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S.
496 (1939), in which it stated:
The privilege of a citizen of the United States to use the streets and
parks for communication of views on national questions may be regu-
lated in the interest of all; it is not absolute, but relative, and must be
exercised in subordination to the general comfort and convenience,
and in consonance with peace and good order; but it must not, in the
guise of regulation, be abridged or denied.
Id. at 515-16. Content-neutral restrictions are viewed as imposing "only an indi-
rect burden on freedom of speech. In such cases, a less demanding form of
judicial review [as compared to content-based restrictions] is used." JEROME A.
BARRON & C. THOMAS DIENES, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 280 (2d ed. 1991). Given
the viewpoint that time, place and manner restrictions only impose an indirect
burden on speech, the courts apply a balancing of interests approach in deter-
mining whether the content-neutral restrictions are reasonable. Id. at 281.
6. 939 F.2d 57 (3d Cir. 1991). In McMonagle II, the Third Circuit had ple-
nary review of the legal issues underlying the injunction. Id. at 61. The Third
Circuit stated that it would only review the details of the injunction to determine
if the district court had abused its discretion. Id. (citing Roe v. Operation Res-
cue, 919 F.2d 857, 871 (3d Cir. 1990)).
7. 312 U.S. 287 (1941).
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exception to the First Amendment protection afforded protesters.8 In
upholding the constitutionality of an injunction, which limited the time,
place and type of protest that antiabortion activists could employ, the
Third Circuit applied a three part test set forth by the United States
Supreme Court in Frisby v. Schultz. 9 This test permits time, place and
manner restrictions on public protests under the First Amendment if the
restrictions "are content-neutral, are narrowly tailored to serve a signifi-
cant government interest, and leave open ample alternative channels of
communication."'10 McMonagle H is unique because the Third Circuit
employed an exception to the Frisby test, under which it applied a lower
level of constitutional scrutiny to an injunction that was issued to restrict
the activities of parties who had a prior history of violence and illegal
acts. I' The Third Circuit reached its decision by utilizing what appears
to be the first federal combination of Milk Wagon Drivers and Frisby in a
freedom of speech context. 12 In applying the Milk Wagon Drivers and
Frisby tests in a First Amendment analysis, the Third Circuit upheld an
injunction against the protesters that dictated the time, location,
number of protesters, volume and many other limits pertaining to their
activities.' 3 In a secondary part of the opinion, the court held that as a
result of subsequent protests, it was lawful to hold Defendant Michael
McMonagle in contempt of the injunction as well as to incarcerate him
for a failure to pay a subsequent fine. 14
II. NORTHEAST WOMEN'S CENTER, INC. V. MCMONAGLE
A. Facts
Northeast Women's Center (Center), a women's health center, 15
8. McMonagle H, 939 F.2d at 62-65. The court noted:
The cases upon which McMonagle bases his free-speech objections to
the instant injunction define the contours of the right to free speech for
the population at large; by contrast, McMonagle and his codefendants
fall into the special category of persons who have been found to have
engaged in illegal, violent, and intimidating conduct.
Id. at 62-63 (footnote omitted). For a discussion of Milk Wagon Drivers and its
impact on the McMonagle H decision, see infra notes 39-44 and accompanying
text.
9. 487 U.S. 474 (1988).
10. Frisby, 487 U.S. at 481 (quoting Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educa-
tors' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983)).
11. McMonagle H, 939 F.2d at 62-67. For a discussion of the McMonagle II
court's application of this exception, see infra notes 39-44 and accompanying
text.
12. Search of WESTLAW (February 5, 1992) (search for records containing
312 w/5 287 (Milk Wagon Drivers citation) & 487 w/5 474 (Frisby citation)).
13. McMonagle H, 939 F.2d at 62-68. For a discussion of these issues, see
infra notes 32-77 and accompanying text.
14. McMonagle H, 939 F.2d at 68-71. For a discussion of the court con-
tempt rulings and sanctions, see infra notes 78-79 and accompanying text.
15. Northeast Women's Center is a private health center that provides
3
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brought an action against antiabortion activists including Michael
McMonagle in three counts: a claim under the Racketeer Influenced
and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), an antitrust claim, and state tort
claims which included trespassing and interference with contract.16 The
Center sued for damages and an injunction. 17 As a result of a jury ver-
dict finding the defendants guilty of civil RICO violations and state tort
violations of trespass and intentional interference with contract, the dis-
trict court granted an injunction. 8 After a subsequent appeal and re-
mand, the injunction was modified to clarify its restrictions. 19 This case
is an appeal by McMonagle asserting a First Amendment challenge to
the modified injunction's constitutionality, as well as a challenge to his
court-ordered incarceration ordered pursuant to his failure to comply
with its contempt sanctions.20
McMonagle is the leader of an antiabortion group that was engaged
in protesting the abortion services of the Northeast Women's Center.2 1
Over a period of two to three years, the protesters engaged in both legal
and illegal forms of protest in front of the Center and in the residential
neighborhoods of some of the Center's employees. 2 2 On numerous oc-
casions the acts were extremely violent and resulted in employee inju-
ries, property damage and disruption of the Center's services. 23 As a
pregnancy testing, gynecological services, abortions and counseling. Brief for
Northeast Women's Center at 3, McMonagle 11, 939 F.2d 57 (3d Cir. 1991) (Nos.
90-1845, 90-1954, 90-1955).
16. Northeast Women's Ctr., Inc. v. McMonagle, 624 F. Supp. 736, 737-38
(E.D. Pa. 1985). Notably, the suit did not challenge the activists' right to free
speech and their right to express their views on abortion. McMonagle 1I, 939
F.2d at 60.
17. McMonagle, 624 F. Supp. at 737.
18. Northeast Women's Ctr., Inc. v. McMonagle, 665 F. Supp. 1147 (E.D.
Pa. 1987), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 868 F.2d 1342 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 493
U.S. 901 (1989), on remand, 745 F. Supp. 1082 (E.D. Pa.), modified, 749 F. Supp.
695 (E.D. Pa. 1990), aff'd as modified, 939 F.2d 57 (3d Cir. 1991).
19. Northeast Women's Ctr., Inc. v. McMonagle, 749 F. Supp. 695 (E.D. Pa.
1990), afd as modified, 939 F2d 57 (ed Cir. 1991). The primary purpose of the
modification was to clarify the restrictions placed on the protesters. Id. at 696-
98. The district court clarified the injunction by defining the prohibited, and
permissible activities in greater detail. Id. The most significant change, which
was later discussed in McMonagle H, was the district court's addition of the 2,500
foot free zone around the personal residences of the Center's employees. Id. at
697-98. The original injunction did not define the size of this protected zone.
See Northeast Women's Ctr., Inc. v. McMonagle, 745 F. Supp. 1082, 1096 (E.D.
Pa.), modified, 749 F. Supp. 695 (E.D. Pa. 1990), aff'd as modified, 939 F.2d 57 (3d
Cir. 1991).
20. McMonagle 11, 939 F.2d 57, 59 (3d Cir. 1991).
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. The McMonagle I court emphasized the types of acts committed by
McMonagle in deciding that the injunction did not violate his First Amendment
rights. Id. at 62-63. Videotaped evidence established the occurrence of these
acts. Id. at 59. The protesters harassed patients and employees by beating on
their cars and shouting vulgarities at them. McMonagle I, 868 F.2d 1342, 1345-
19921
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result of the defendant's convictions for civil RICO and tort violations, 24
the district court issued a modified injunction to ensure the continued
operation of the clinic, to allow for more effective law enforcement and
to protect the privacy rights of Center staff, employees and owners. 25
This injunction prohibited interference with the Center, severely re-
stricted protest activities within 500 feet of the Center, limited the noise
levels of the protests during the hours of surgical procedure, and re-
stricted protests to a distance of 2,500 feet from private residences of
the employees and others affiliated with the Center.2 6 The injunction
48 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 901 (1989), on remand, 745 F. Supp. 1082 (E.D.
Pa.), modified, 749 F. Supp. 695 (E.D. Pa. 1990), aff'das modified, 939 F.2d 57 (3d
Cir. 1991). Some of the more extraordinary acts included:
1) On December 8, 1984, approximately fifty protesters including
twelve defendants, rushed into the Center's premises, and knocked
down Center employees who attempted to prevent the entry, result-
ing in injuries to one of the employees. Once inside, access to the
Center was blocked and medical supplies were thrown on the floor.
Brief for the Northeast Women's Center, supra note 15, at 3-5.
2) On August 10, 1985, twelve defendants forced their way into the
Center, injuring an employee. Center machinery was damaged and
disassembled. Id.
3) On October 19, 1985, the Center was rushed and an employee was
knocked down in the process. Id.
4) On May 23, 1986, protesters occupied the Center's waiting room
and harassed patients. Id.
The protesters' activities were described as "frenzied" at times, causing those
around the Center to fear for their physical safety. Id.
24. McMonagle 1, 868 F.2d at 1357.
25. Northeast Women's Ctr., Inc. v. McMonagle, 749 F. Supp. 695, 696-700
(E.D. Pa. 1990), aff'd as modified, 939 F.2d 57 (3d Cir. 1991).
26. Id. at 698-700. It is this modified injunction that is under attack in the
current case. McMonagle II, 939 F.2d at 59. The challenged parts of the modi-
fied injunction included paragraphs A(5), A(6), A(7), A(8)(0 and A(9). Brief for
McMonagle at 11-12, McMonagle II (Nos. 90-1845, 90-1954, 90-1955). The chal-
lenged sections of the modified injunction read as follows:
A(5) During the hours 6:30 a.m. through 5:00 p.m. on Wednesdays, Fridays,
and Saturdays, during surgical procedures and recovery periods,
no singing, chanting, use of bullhorns, sound amplification equip-
ment, or other sounds or images observable to or within earshot
of patients inside the Center are permitted, with the exception of
those set forth in paragraph A(6), below.
A(6) During the hours 6:30 a.m. through 5:00 p.m. on Wednesdays, Fridays,
and Saturdays, defendants are permitted to maintain no informa-
tional table closer than five hundred (500) feet from the plaintiff's
property line as designated on the attached plot plan, except that
one such table may be located on the sidewalk off the north side
of the Comly Road alongside the Northeast Women's Center, at
the location marked clearly with visual devices at the point desig-
nated on the attached plot plan as Area "A," with no more than
one (1) signed [sic] attached to it displaying words of an informa-
tion [sic], non-inflammatory and non-violent nature. Any two de-
fendants or any two individuals selected by defendants may
peacefully maintain the table and may distribute literature or
speak to individuals who wish to communicate with them immedi-
982
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applied to the defendants and "all persons acting in concert or partici-
ately at the table. The individuals who staff this table may not
shout out or use sound amplification equipment or physically ap-
proach plaintiff's patients or staff, but may engage in communica-
tions consisting of conversation of a non-threatening nature with
any patient or staff person who choose to approach the table and
speak to them. Should any individual decline such communica-
tion, otherwise known as "sidewalk counseling," that person shall
have the absolute right to leave or walk away, and defendants, as
well as all those covered by this restraining order, shall not ac-
company such person, encircle, surround, harass, threaten or
physically or verbally abuse those individuals who choose not to
communicate with them. This communication or "sidewalk coun-
seling" shall not limit the right of the Police Department and/or
the United States Marshal to maintain public order by reasonably
necessary rules and regulations as they decide are necessary at the
Center.
A(7) At all times including the times enumerated in paragraphs A(5) &
A(6), the defendants, as named above, their officers, agents, ser-
vants, employees and attorneys, and all persons acting in concert
or participating with, by or through them shall not congregate,
demonstrate, counsel, picket, sing, chant, use sound amplification
equipment, or engage in any other protest activity within five-
hundred (500) feet of the outer perimeter of the property of
either the L.P. Partnership or Comly Road Associates as desig-
nated on the attached plot plan, except that as many as six (6)
persons may peacefully picket on the sidewalk off the north side
of Comly Road alongside the Northeast Women's Center, in two
areas marked on the attached plot plan as Area "B" on both sides
of the driveway. While acting as a picketer, each such person shall
be clearly designated by [clothing], signs, or other plainly visible
devices. The driveway shall be kept clear at all times for passage
of vehicles and pedestrians and shall be clearly marked by plaintiff
with plainly visible devices. Except as limited by this paragraph
and paragraphs A(5) and A(6) above, the persons designated
picketing may peacefully demonstrate, speak out, sing or chant on
days other than Wednesday, Friday, or Saturday.
A(8) At all times on all days, the defendants are prohibited from carry-
ing out the following acts: (a) entering upon the Northeast Wo-
men's Center, L.P. Partnership's or Comly Road Associates'
property .... and (i) any other actions which have or reasonably
might have the effect of intimidating patients, employees or staff
members.
A(9) At all times on all days, defendants are prohibited from congregat-
ing, picketing, patrolling, demonstrating or using bullhorns or
other sound amplification equipment within twenty-five hundred
(2,500) feet of the residence of any of plaintiff's employees, staff,
owners or agents, or blocking or attempting to block, barricade,
or in any other manner obstruct the entrances, exits or driveways
of the residences of any of the plaintiff's employees, staff, owners
or agents and are prohibited from inhibiting or impeding or at-
tempting to impede the free ingress or egress of persons to any
street that provides the sole access to the street on which those
residences are located.
McMonagle II, 939 F.2d at 72-73.
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McMonagle challenged the injunction claiming that it unconstitu-
tionally infringed on his First Amendment rights. 28 He argued that the
injunction imposed a "prior restraint" on free speech, that its provisions
were vague and overbroad, and that it denied equal protection of the
law to the protesters. 29 The Center responded by stating that "the in-
junction is a carefully-crafted, reasonable 'time, place and manner' re-
striction on the defendants' expression."' 30 The Third Circuit's analysis
focused primarily on whether the injunction was constitutional and
briefly addressed the issues of contempt and incarceration that may re-
sult from violating the injunction. 3 1
B. Analysis
1. Constitutionality of the Permanent Injunction-Center
In addressing whether the injunction was an impermissible infringe-
ment on McMonagle's First Amendment rights, the Third Circuit fol-
lowed some well-established guidelines developed by the Supreme
Court in Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence3 2 and Frisby v.
27. Northeast Women's Ctr., Inc. v. McMonagle, 745 F. Supp. 1082, 1094-
95 (E.D. Pa.), modified, 749 F. Supp. 695 (E.D. Pa. 1990), aff'd as modified, 939
F.2d 57 (3d Cir. 1991). This part of the original permanent injunction was not
modified. Northeast Women's Ctr., Inc. v. McMonagle, 749 F. Supp. 695, 698
(E.D. Pa. 1990), affid as modified, 939 F.2d 57 (3d Cir. 1991).
28. Brief for McMonagle, supra note 26, at 11-35.
29. Id. at 11. The court did not address the assertion that the injunction
was a violation of equal protection because it did not interpret McMonagle's
brief as making an equal protection argument. McMonagle 11, 939 F.2d at 62 n.8.
30. McMonagle 11, 939 F.2d at 62; see also Brief for Northeast Women's
Center, supra note 15, at 15 ("The injunction at issue ... does not prohibit
expression at these sites, but rather places restrictions on the time, place and
manner of the defendant's expression."). For a discussion of "time, place and
manner" restrictions, see supra note 5.
31. McMonagle 11, 939 F.2d at 62-70.
32. 468 U.S. 288 (1984). The Community for Creative Non-Violence
(CCNV) challenged a National Park Service regulation that prohibited camping
overnight in certain Washington, D.C. parks. Id. at 292. The Park Service au-
thorized a permit to erect two tent cities, but in accordance with its regulations
denied CCNV's request that demonstrators be permitted to sleep in the tents.
Id. at 291-92. The CCNV brought an action to challenge the no-camping regu-
lations. Id. at 292. The CCNV claimed that the regulations were "unconstitu-
tionally vague, had been discriminatorily applied, and could not be applied to
prevent sleeping in the tents without violating the First Amendment." Id. The
Supreme Court recognized that the overnight sleeping was a form of expressive
conduct and, therefore, "protected to some extent by the First Amendment."
Id. at 293. The Court stated, however, that oral, written and conduct-based ex-
pression was subject to reasonable time, place and manner restrictions. Id. To
determine whether the regulation was reasonable, the Court applied a three-part
test: the restrictions must be content-neutral, narrowly tailored to serve a signif-
icant government interest, and they must leave open ample alternative channels
of communication. Id. at 293 (citing Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators'
Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45-46 (1983)). The Court held that the Park Service regula-
984 [Vol. 37: p. 978
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Schultz.3 3 Clark stands for the proposition that the government may im-
pose reasonable time, place and manner restrictions on expression when
such restrictions are motivated by reasons independent of the content of
the speech.34 The Court in Frisby reiterated the permissibility of time,
place and manner restrictions and applied the same test to the ordi-
nance at issue. 35 The McMonagle II court applied this three-part test to
determine the permissibility of the time, place and manner restrictions
contained in the injunction. 36 The test, as articulated by the Third Cir-
cuit, requires that time, place and manner restrictions: a) be content-
neutral, b) be narrowly tailored to serve significant government inter-
ests, and c) leave open alternative channels of communication.3 7 Except
for paragraph A(9), which restricted protests near staff residences, the
court held that the injunction satisfied these requirements. 38
One of the more unique aspects of the McMonagle II decision was
the Third Circuit's use of Milk Wagon Drivers Union, Local 753 v.
Meadowmoor Dairies to create a bifurcated approach to First Amendment
tion was constitutionally permissible because the government's interest in pre-
serving the parks outweighed the demonstrators' need to sleep in the parks in
order to convey their message. Id. at 298-99.
33. 487 U.S. 474 (1988) (suit by abortion protesters to challenge constitu-
tionality of municipal ordinance that prohibited picketing before or about resi-
dences of any individual).
34. Clark, 468 U.S. at 299. Clark illustrates the Supreme Court's well-estab-
lished precedent that allows for reasonable time, place and manner restrictions
on expression. Id. at 293 (citing City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for
Vincent, 466 U.S. 789 (1984); Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n,
460 U.S. 37 (1983)).
35. Frisby, 487 U.S. at 481 (noting that all restrictions on public speech
must be judged in accordance with this test).
36. McMonagle 1I, 939 F.2d 57, 62 (3d Cir. 1991).
37. Id. (citing Frisby, 487 U.S. 474 (quoting Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local
Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983))). The Third Circuit also noted the
recent use of this principle in Barnes v. Glen Theatre, 111 S. Ct. 2456, 2460-61
(1991) (upholding statutory restriction on nude dancing). McMonagle II, 939
F.2d at 62 n.9; see also U.S. Postal Serv. v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass'ns,
453 U.S. 114, 132, cert. denied, 453 U.S. 917 (1981) (finding no violation of First
Amendment in postal restriction against placement of unstamped mailable mat-
ter in letter boxes because restriction not aimed at content of messages); Con-
solidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 535-37 (1980)
(invalidating New York Public Service Commission order that prohibited inclu-
sion in monthly bills of inserts discussing controversial public policy issues be-
cause restrictions were based on content of inserts); Grayned v. City of
Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 119-21 (1972) (invalidating antipicketing ordinance but
upholding antinoise ordinance that prohibited protesters from willfully dis-
turbing classrooms); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (invalidating
licensing requirement aimed at religious organizations because acted as com-
plete bar on communication); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939) (uphold-
ing ordinance limiting manner and place of hand bill distributions upon public
streets as reasonable exercise of police power).
38. McMonagle II, 939 F.2d at 59 (stating that paragraph A(9) was not "suffi-
ciently narrowly tailored to pass constitutional muster").
8
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time, place and manner analysis. 39 The court construed Milk Wagon
Drivers to allow for a lower level of scrutiny in the Frisby analysis if the
injunction in question applied to the activities of a "special category of
persons found to have engaged in illegal, violent, and intimidating con-
duct."'40 This lower level of scrutiny gives greater leeway to the court in
fashioning an injunction when applied to defendants falling into the
"special category." '4 1 The Third Circuit did not approach scrutiny levels
in terms of the traditional three-tier approach (i.e. strict, intermediate
and rational basis); rather, the court's balancing of interests approach is
39. In Milk Wagon Drivers, the Supreme Court upheld a permanent injunc-
tion against the protest activities of a labor union. Milk Wagon Drivers Union,
Local 753 v. Meadowmoor Dairies, 312 U.S. 287, 298-99 (1941). The injunc-
tion, which enjoined all picketing by the Union, was challenged by the Milk
Wagon Drivers as an infringement on their freedom of speech. Id. at 291. In
the events leading up to the injunction, the Union had engaged in protest activi-
ties that resulted in a significant amount of property damage and personal inju-
ries. Id. at 291-92. The Supreme Court was asked to review whether a state
could authorize its courts to "enjoin acts of picketing in themselves peaceful
when they are enmeshed with contemporaneously violent conduct which is con-
cededly outlawed." Id. at 292. The Supreme Court upheld the injunction taking
notice that the "acts of violence were neither episodic nor isolated." Id. at 295.
The decision affirmed the state's right to enjoin violence in the form of future
coercion, as opposed to solely a right to enjoin protest activities. Id. at 296. The
Court cautioned that the right to free speech should not be infringed upon by
the state based on acts of violence unrelated to the initial protests, nor "may the
state enjoin peaceful picketing merely because it may provoke violence in
others." Id. (citing Cantwell, 310 U.S. 296; Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697,
721-22 (1931)).
The brief for McMonagle never acknowledged Milk Wagon Drivers. See Brief
for McMonagle, supra note 26. McMonagle's arguments centered on the general
right to freedom of speech, but never acknowledged that the injunction was is-
sued as the result of past illegal behavior. Id. This omission was noted by the
Third Circuit and may explain why the court repeats throughout the opinion
that the Appellant has a history of violent and illegal behavior. See McMonagle II,
939 F.2d at 62-63.
The Third Circuit's use of Milk Wagon Drivers is not unique in that the prin-
ciples it espouses are novel, but rather because it has been cited so infrequently
by the federal courts in its 50 year history. The Supreme Court has positively
cited this opinion approximately 10 times in the last 50 years, and much of its
acknowledgement has been either through minority opinions or when the ma-
jority has distinguished the decision. Search of WESTLAW, Shepard's (Febru-
ary 3, 1992). In short, it has been a decision that has usually been ignored or has
presented an obstacle for majorities to "get around." Id. Milk Wagon Drivers has
been used even more sparingly by the Third Circuit over the last five decades.
Id.
Commentators have suggested that the Milk Wagon Drivers approach to dem-
onstrations associated with violent disorder had fallen out of favor. One writer
noted that "[the Supreme Court] has shifted away from its judgment in the [Milk
Wagon Drivers v.] Meadowmoor Dairies case, and it is more likely now to up-
hold the claimed right of citizens to demonstrate peacefully, even when some
fraction of those who support a common cause have turned to violence." DAVID
TUCKER, LAw, LIBERALISM AND FREE SPEECH 142 (1985).
40. McMonagle 11, 939 F.2d at 63 (emphasis added).
41. See, e.g., McMonagle 11, 939 F.2d 57.
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evocative of Justice Marshall's "sliding-scale." 4 2  Although the
McMonagle court never explicitly stated that a bifurcated approach with
differing levels of scrutiny should be employed, this approach can be
inferred from the court's language and analysis.43 In supporting its use
of the Milk Wagon Drivers' "special category," and the accompanying
lower level of scrutiny, the Third Circuit stated that "injunctions similar
to the one imposed in this case by the district court have regularly been
upheld.'44
The first element of the Frisby test requires that "time, place, and
manner" restrictions be content-neutral.4 5 The Third Circuit ruled that
the injunction in this case satisfied this requirement because it restricted
the time, volume, location and nature of the expressive activity, but it
never attempted to dictate the content of the protesters' message.4 6
The court stated that "[t]he challenged sections of the injunction make
no mention whatsoever of abortion or any substantive issue ... and...
[the injunction] could apply equally to protests which supported abor-
tion as well as to protests which opposed abortion.""47
42. Id. at 63-67. Marshall's "sliding scale" was discussed in San Antonio
Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 98-110 (1973) (Marshall,
J., dissenting). Recognizing the need for greater flexibility in scrutiny levels ap-
plied by the Supreme Court, Marshall proposed the sliding-scale as an alterna-
tive to the traditional "two-tier" approach to equal protection review. STONE,
supra note 5, at 898. The sliding scale would allow the Court to adjust the scru-
tiny level after considering the interests presented in each case. Id. This anal-
ogy is noted because the Third Circuit's analysis suggests a flexible approach to
scrutiny of injunctions which slides in accordance with the type of behavior pre-
viously exhibited by the protesters. See McMonagle 11, 939 F.2d at 62-65. This
flexible approach to scrutiny is illustrated by the variety of tests employed by the
Third Circuit in its analysis. See id. For a discussion of the different tests used in
McMonagle II, see infra notes 45-61 & 84-88 and accompanying text.
43. When discussing cases that involve groups which have engaged in vio-
lence as part of their protest activities, the Third Circuit stated that "[t]he right
of a court to enter an injunction restricting the form and location of expressive
activity is particularly clear in a such a context." McMonagle 11, 939 F.2d at 62
(emphasis added).
44. Id. at 63 (emphasis added); see, e.g., New York State NOW v. Terry, 886
F.2d 1339 (2d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 947 (1990) (upholding permanent
injunction that enjoined antiabortion protesters from blocking access to abor-
tion facilities); Portland Feminist Women's Health Ctr. v. Advocates for Life,
Inc., 859 F.2d 681 (9th Cir. 1988) (upholding injunction that enjoined antiabor-
tion activists from obstructing access to abortion clinic and established "free
zone" extending 12.5 feet to right and left of clinic's front door and also from
front door to curb).
45. McMonagle 11, 939 F.2d at 62-63 (citing Frisby, 487 U.S. at 481).
46. Id. at 63.
47. Id. The court relied on these same reasons to reject McMonagle's argu-
ment that the injunction was a "prior restraint" on his freedom of speech. Id.
Although it did not mention the source of its definition, the Third Circuit stated
that "[a] prior restraint is a content-based restriction on speech prior to its oc-
currence. " Id. It is important to note the Third Circuit's definition of prior re-
straint in this context considering that the definition has become blurred over the
history of constitutional adjudication. See TRIBE, supra note 3, § 12-34, at 1040.
1992] 987
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The second step of the Frisby analysis requires that the injunction
must be narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest.4 8
The significant government interests relied upon in McMonagle H in-
cluded the protection of patient health and the maintenance of medical
standards. 49 The court relied on Roe v. Wade,50 in which the Supreme
Court established that, in the performance of abortions, safeguarding
patient health and maintaining medical standards are important govern-
ment interests. 5 1 The McMonagle H court decided that there was a
threat to these interests because the protesters' singing, shouting and
chanting was audible in the Center's operating rooms and these disrup-
tions could result in "adverse medical consequences to patients." 52 The
court ruled that the evidence established, without a doubt, that the in-
junction protected a significant government interest.53
Once the court established that the restrictions served a significant
government interest, the next step of its analysis was to determine if the
injunction was narrowly tailored. 54 The McMonagle H court held that all
of the restrictions surrounding the protest of the Center were narrowly
tailored and a reasonable exercise of the district court's power. 55 In a
Tribe commented that "[o]nly rarely has the Court acknowledged the central
feature of prior restraints: the doctrine imposes a special bar on attempts to
suppress speech prior to publication, a bar that is distinct from the scope of
constitutional protection accorded the material after publication." Id. Some
commentators have gone so far as to say that the "doctrine [of prior restraint] is
so far removed from its historic function, so variously and discrepantly applied,
and so often deflective of sound understanding, that it no longer warrants use as
an independent category of First Amendment analysis." John Calvin Jeffries,Jr.,
Rethinking Prior Restraint, 92 YALE L.J. 409, 437 (1982), cited in TRIBE, supra note
3, § 12-34, at 1040 n. 11.
48. McMonagle H, 939 F.2d at 63 (citing Frisby, 487 U.S. at 4).
49. Id.; see also Brief for the Northeast Women's Center, supra note 15, at 7.
50. 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973), quoted in McMonagle H, 939 F.2d at 63. The
Roe Court held that the government had a "legitimate interest in seeing to it that
an abortion, like any other medical procedure, is performed under circum-
stances that insure maximum safety for the patient." Id. at 150, quoted in
McMonagle H, 939 F.2d at 63.
51. Roe, 410 U.S. at 154.
52. McMonagle H, 939 F.2d at 63. A doctor employed by the Center testi-
fied that the noise created by the protesters "would put patients 'under consid-
erably greater stress,' especially when going under or coming out of general
anesthesia." McMonagle I, 868 F.2d 1342, 1346 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S.
901 (1989), on remand, 745 F. Supp. 1082 (E.D. Pa.), modified, 749 F. Supp. 695
(E.D. Pa. 1990), aff'd as modified, 939 F.2d 57 (3d Cir. 1991).
53. McMonagle II, 939 F.2d at 63.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 63-65. The court individually reviewed the restrictions imposed
by paragraphs A(5), A(6) and A(7). For the complete text of these sections, see
supra note 26. The Third Circuit found that paragraph A(5) was intended to
minimize the potential effect of the protests on the patients. Since it was only in
effect during the operating and recovery hours, and only limited activities that
may affect patients during those hours-while preserving all other means of pro-
test-it was held to be narrowly tailored. McMonagle H, 939 F.2d at 63. This is
988' [Vol. 37: p. 978
11
Yanchik: Constitutional Law - First Amendment - Third Circuit Use of Injun
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1992
1992] THIRD CIRCUIT REVIEW 989
flexible "narrowly tailored" analysis of the injunction, the Third Circuit
used a different test for each restriction (paragraph) it reviewed. In its
review of paragraph A(5), the court applied a Frisby-type analysis in
which it looked to see if the restriction focused on the enumerated
"evil." '5 6 For paragraph A(6), the court applied a "central purpose"
analysis from Grayned v. City of Rockford which focused on whether the
restricted activity interfered with the primary function of the protected
institution. 57 Finally, in its review of paragraph A(7), the court deter-
mined whether the restrictions were necessary to achieve the previously
unarticulated government interest of "enforcement" of the injunction. 58
an example of the Frisby "narrowly tailored" analysis since it focuses on whether
the restriction "targets and eliminates no more than the exact source of the 'evil'
it seeks to remedy." Frisby, 487 U.S. at 485. However, the Third Circuit does
not employ the Frisby Court's language.
Paragraph A(6) restricted the use of tables for the dissemination of informa-
tion to 500 feet from the Center, limited the signs on the table to non-inflam-
matory and non-violent words, and limited staffers of the table strictly to
disseminating information while refraining from any type of harassment.
McMonagle 11, 939 F.2d at 63. These restrictions were held to be "reasonable in
light of the functions of the center." Id. at 64. Here, the court introduced a new
authority, Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972) (upholding anti-
noise ordinance outside school instituted to prevent interference within school).
McMonagle H, 939 F.2d at 64. The Grayned Court "reasoned that the nature and
pattern of normal activities of an institution or organization dictate what is a
reasonable time, place, and manner restriction." Id. (emphasis added) (citing
Grayned, 408 U.S. at 116). In light of this authority, the Third Circuit held that
the A(6) restrictions were reasonable in that they prevented interference with
the central functions of the Center, which include ensuring patient safety and
comfort. Id.
Paragraph A(7) restricts picketing within 500 feet of the Center, but allows
for six picketers to be present as long as they are clearly designated by some
form of clothing, signs or an equivalent thereof. Id. at 65. The court reasoned
that these restrictions and the required markings were reasonable to ensure that
the picketers are easily recognized to assist in the "enforcement" of the injunc-
tion. Id. McMonagle challenged the requirement of having to be clearly marked
as a "form of compulsory speech," prohibited by the First Amendment. Id. In
support of his argument, McMonagle cited West Virginia Board of Education v.
Barnett, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (overturning requirement that schoolchildren
pledge allegiance to flag) and Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977) (over-
turning state requirement that car owners display state motto-"Live Free or
Die"-on license plates). McMonagle 11, 939 F.2d at 65. The Third Circuit dis-
tinguished the present case from the authorities cited by McMonagle. Id. In the
cited cases, the parties had no choice regarding the messages that were imposed
upon them. Id. In McMonagle's case, the protesters did not have to enter the
500 foot zone, and thus could avoid the requirement. Id. More importantly, the
injunction does not require the picketers to "bear any particular label or com-
municate any particular viewpoint." Id.
56. Frisby, 487 U.S. at 485. For a discussion of the court's analysis of
whether paragraph A(5) of the injunction was "narrowly tailored," see supra
note 55.
57. Grayned, 408 U.S. at 116; See McMonagle 11, 939 F.2d at 64. For a discus-
sion of the court's analysis of whether paragraph A(6) of the injunction was
"narrowly tailored," see supra note 55.
58. McMonagle 11, 939 F.2d at 65. For a discussion of the court's analysis of
12
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 37, Iss. 4 [1992], Art. 15
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol37/iss4/15
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
Although many of the same results might have been reached using only
the Frisby test for narrow tailoring, the approach employed by the Third
Circuit is considerably more flexible and creates a less rigid analysis. 59
The Third Circuit held that all sections of the injunction satisfied
the third element of the Frisby test which required that restrictions leave
open ample alternative channels of communication. 60 The key factor
for the court was that none of the injunction's restrictions prevented the
protesters from in some way delivering their message and that they
could "at all times engage in expressive activity near the Center." 6 '
2. Constitutionality of the Permanent Injunction-Residences
In a separate section of the opinion, the Third Circuit addressed the
constitutionality of the 2,500-foot protective zone around the personal
residences of the Center's employees, staff, owners or agents imposed
by paragraph A(9) of the injunction. 62 The court addressed this section
of the injunction separately because it was the only section that did not
pass the previously articulated constitutional standards. 6 3 The court ul-
timately modified the section-as it related to picketing and patrolling-
to reduce the size of the private zone to 500 feet since it could not justify
whether paragraph A(7) of the injunction was "narrowly tailored," see supra
note 55.
59. McMonagle also challenged the injunction claiming that it was too
vague. McMonagle 11, 939 F.2d at 64 (questioning meaning of terms such as
"demonstrate," "protest," and "non-inflammatory"). The court dismissed this
claim as meritless citing the present case's past history of violence as a justifica-
tion for use of the specific injunction terms. Id. The court implied that
McMonagle should have received guidance from his past acts which the injunc-
tion sought to prohibit. Id.
McMonagle argued that his case was governed by NAACP v. Claiborne
Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886 (1982), which cautioned against speech restriction
based on trivial or insubstantial instances of violence. See Brief for McMonagle,
supra note 26, at 13-16. The Third Circuit did not even address this case other
than by comparing it to Milk Wagon Drivers. McMonagle 1, 939 F.2d at 64. In the
Third Circuit's conclusion, Milk Wagon Drivers was the appropriate governing
case given the extent of the previous illegal acts. Id.
60. McMonagle 11, 939 F.2d at 63-65.
61. Id. at 64.
62. Id. at 66-68. The court separately analyzed the constitutionality of the
restrictions imposed on the demonstrations at the private residences of the em-
ployees, staff, owners and agents. Id. After the first injunction was issued, there
was no specific designation as to the size of the free zone to be created around
the residences. Northeast Women's Ctr., Inc. v. McMonagle, 745 F. Supp. 1082
(E.D. Pa.), modified, 749 F. Supp. 695 (E.D. Pa. 1991), aff'd as modified, 939 F.2d
57 (3d Cir. 1991). Upon motion by the Center for clarification and/or reconsid-
eration of the injunction, the district court, among other things, added the 2,500
foot restriction to clarify the size of the residential-free zone. Northeast Wo-
men's Ctr., Inc. v. McMonagle, 749 F. Supp. 695 (E.D. Pa. 1990), afdas modified,
939 F.2d 57 (3d Cir. 1991). For the full text of paragraph A(9), see supra note
26.
63. McMonagle 11, 939 F.2d at 66-67. For a discussion of the court's consti-
tutional analysis, see infra notes 69-74 and accompanying text.
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such an expansive zone based on the district court's limited findings. 64
As was the case at the Center, the Third Circuit found that the
protesters' demonstrations at the private residences were excessive and
in need of restriction. 65 The court utilized the authority established by
the Supreme Court in Frisby v. Schultz 66 and Carey v. Brown 6 7 to develop
a protective zone around the private residences. In these cases, "[t]he
Supreme Court ... recognized the government's interest in 'protecting
the well-being, tranquility and privacy of the home.' "68
Although the injunction protected what was clearly a significant
government interest, the second part of the Frisby test required that the
injunction also be narrowly tailored to achieve its intended purpose. 69
To determine whether the injunction was narrowly tailored, the Third
Circuit analyzed the restrictive zone in two parts: a) whether it was rea-
sonable in terms of restricting noise, such as bullhorns or other sound
amplification equipment, and b) whether it was reasonable in terms of
the picketing and patrolling.70 Given the intrusive nature of bullhorns
64. McMonagle 11, 939 F.2d at 67. In justifying its power to rewrite the in-junction, the court noted that it had plenary review over "the threshold question
of whether the injunction fits within the parameters established by the Constitu-
tion." Id. at 66. Accordingly, the court has the power to rewrite an injunctive
order that "exceeds permissible legal parameters." Id. at 67; see Evans v.
Buchanan, 555 F.2d 373 (3d Cir.) (revising decree where court disagreed with
language used in original injunction), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 880 (1977); see also
Portland Feminist Women's Health Ctr. v. Advocates for Life, Inc., 859 F.2d
681, 687 (9th Cir. 1988) (modifying injunction that banned noisemaking at
abortion clinic to prohibit only noise that reached a certain volume which inter-
fered with Center).
65. McMonagle 11, 939 F.2d at 66. The court found that McMonagle, and
the other demonstrators, had "embarked on a willful campaign to use fear, har-
assment, intimidation and force against the Center through targeting its employ-
ees so that they would, and some did, sever their employment at the Center.
Employees testified that they were harassed at their homes and that their chil-
dren were afraid." McMonagle I, 868 F.2d 1342, 1355 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 493
U.S. 901 (1989), on remand, 745 F. Supp. 1082 (E.D. Pa.), modified, 749 F. Supp.
695 (E.D. Pa. 1990), aff'd as modified, 939 F.2d 57 (3d Cir. 1991).
66. 487 U.S. 474 (1988), cited in McMonagle 11, 939 F.2d at 65. In Frisby, the
Court upheld an ordinance that banned picketing focused around a single
house. Frisby, 487 U.S. at 482-83. The ordinance did allow for protesters to
demonstrate in the neighborhood of a targeted house, as long as the activities
did not concentrate on any single residence. Id. at 483-84.
67. 447 U.S. 455 (1980), cited in McMonagle II, 939 F.2d at 66. Carey in-
volved the constitutionality of an Illinois residential picketing statute. Carey, 447
U.S. 455. Although the Court ruled against the statute as being in violation of
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, it reaffirmed the
validity of these types of restrictions and the very important government interest
of protecting the sanctity of the home. Id. at 470-71.
68. McMonagle 11, 939 F.2d at 66 (citations omitted).
69. For a discussion of the Frisby test and the "narrowly tailored" require-
ment, see supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text.
70. McMonagle 11, 939 F.2d at 66. Although the court never explained the
basis for its decision to analyze the specific types of activities separately, it ap-
nears as if it was attempting to ensure the protection of what the Carey Court has
1992]
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and sound amplification equipment, the 2,500-foot restriction was found
to be a reasonable distance to protect the previously discussed inter-
ests. 7 1 The Third Circuit, however, held that the 2,500-foot restriction
was not narrowly tailored when applied to picketing and patrolling. 7 2
The primary problem with the restriction was that the "district court...
made no finding of fact and provided no discussion informing [the
Third Circuit] of the basis for its selection of a 2,500 foot protected
zone." 73 Given the absence of findings, the Third Circuit did not decide
on the constitutionality of the residential restriction but remanded this
portion of the injunction for further consideration by the district
court.74
Apparently to find an acceptable middle ground, the Third Circuit
modified the injunction and reduced the residential protective zone to
500 feet.7 5 This number is based on the size of the protective zone ap-
plied to the Center. 76 The court reasoned, in the absence of any other
logical basis, that the homes deserved at least the same amount of pro-
termed the "tranquility and privacy" of the home. See Carey, 447 U.S. at 471.
Previous courts have noted that the protection of residential privacy is unique in
that it must protect unwilling listeners who are held captive in their own homes.
Frisby, 487 U.S. at 484-85; see also Rowan v. Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728
(1970) (upholding citizens' right to prevent offensive mail from being sent to
their homes). In the case of intrusive messages (i.e., amplified protests aimed at
a particular home), the Supreme Court has "repeatedly held that individuals are
not required to welcome unwanted speech into their own homes and that the
government may protect this freedom." Frisby, 487 U.S. at 485. Since sound is
capable of intruding into the home, as opposed to signs carried in silent protest,
the Third Circuit is apparently applying the "narrowly tailored" section of the
time, place and manner test to each means employed by the protesters.
71. McMonagle H, 939 F.2d at 66. McMonagle's counsel conceded in oral
argument that this restriction was reasonable. Id.
72. Id. at 66-67. The court noted:
[T]he First Amendment issue involved here requires us to ensure that
the remedy prescribed by the district court was narrowly tailored to its
legitimate purpose. Under ordinary circumstances, the 2,500 foot re-
striction appears to be larger than necessary to achieve the remedial
purpose for which the injunction was imposed. This is so even given
the defendants' history and actions.
Id. at 67.
73. Id. By comparison, when the district court formulated the injunction, it
used a map describing the specific protest area as a basis for the 500 foot protec-
tive zone around the Center. Northeast Women's Ctr., Inc. v. McMonagle, 745
F. Supp. 1082, modified, 749 F. Supp. 695 (E.D. Pa. 1990), aff'd as modified, 939
F.2d 57 (3d Cir. 1991).
74. McMonagle H, 939 F.2d at 67 n.14. The court noted that findings may
support the 2,500-foot restriction as applied to picketing and patrolling. Id.
The Third Circuit mentioned that the restriction would probably not pass con-
stitutional muster in light of Frisby, which specifically looked to enjoin residential
picketing that took place in front of a single residence. Id. at 67.
75. Id. at 67, 71.
76. Id. at 71. The court recognized that this figure was not specifically sup-
ported by the record. Id.
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tection as the Center. 77
In the final sections of the opinion, the Third Circuit addressed and
dismissed McMonagle's challenges to the district court's decision find-
ing him in contempt of the original injunction, the court-ordered fines
and his subsequent imprisonment. 78 After its review of the challenges,
the Third Circuit was "satisfied that McMonagle's incarceration was
proper and that the sanctions imposed by the district court were well
within its discretion." 79
III. CONCLUSION
In its review of First Amendment restrictions on injunctions, the
Third Circuit relies on well-established precedent.8 0 In its analysis,
however, the court shows a tendency to read the First Amendment nar-
rowly through two significant diversions from the original Supreme
Court tests articulated in Frisby v. Schultz. 8 ' The Third Circuit closely
77. Id.
78. Id. at 68-70. McMonagle made a number of challenges to the district
court's rulings including:
1) McMonagle disputed the district court's basis for finding him in con-
tempt. The district court found that McMonagle "announced his
intention to disobey the order" and subsequently picketed in front
of an employee's home. Since McMonagle failed to raise any chal-
lenges to these findings, the Third Circuit held that he was properly
found in contempt. Id. at 68.
2) McMonagle claimed that the district court erred when it failed to
grant him a continuance to find a new attorney to represent him.
Given that McMonagle fired his attorney so that he could represent
himself, then apparently changed his mind, the Third Circuit found
no error in the district court's decision. Id. at 68-69.
3) McMonagle challenged the district court's decision to imprison him
for failing to pay fines imposed due to his contempt. Noting that the
district court has broad discretion to fashion civil contempt reme-
dies, including imprisonment, the Third Circuit held that there was
no basis to McMonagle's challenges. Id. at 69-70 (citing In re Ar-
thur Treacher's Franchise Litig., 689 F.2d 1150 (3d Cir. 1982); Del-
aware Valley Citizens' Council v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania,
678 F.2d 470 (3d Cir.) (holding that state officials could be jailed for
violation of contempt orders), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 969 (1982)).
4) McMonagle challenged the district court's denial of his motion to
stay incarceration and sanctions. The Third Circuit did not discuss
this since it could not find an argument in McMonagle's brief that
supported this challenge. Id. at 70.
Since receiving the protective injunction, the Center has filed fourteen mo-
tions for civil contempt for alleged violations by protesters. Northeast Women's
Ctr. v. McMonagle, No. CIV. AMI 85-4845, 1992 WL 13031, at *1 (E.D. Pa.Jan.
22, 1992). In a recent decision, the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania held Anthony Sulpizio in contempt for violations of the
modified permanent injunction upheld in McMonagle I. Id. at *6.
79. McMonagle 11, 939 F.2d at 70.
80. For a discussion of the cases relied on by the Third Circuit, see supra
notes 7, 9, 32-33, 39, 57 & 67 and accompanying text.
81. 487 U.S. 474 (1988).
16
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 37, Iss. 4 [1992], Art. 15
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol37/iss4/15
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
tracks the Frisby analysis throughout its opinion; however, it diverges
from the test for a "narrowly tailored" restriction.8 2 The Frisby Court
stated that a restriction is "narrowly tailored if it targets and eliminates
no more than the exact source of the 'evil' it seeks to remedy." '8 3 The
Third Circuit never mentioned this test in its opinion. In fact, the court
did not commit to any specific test to determine whether a restriction is
narrowly tailored, and actually vacillated between authorities as it ana-
lyzed the different elements of the injunction.84 In place of the Frisby
test, the court relied on an ambiguous exception to the "narrowly tai-
lored" rule which looked at whether the restrictions were reasonable in
light of the defendants' past history of violence and illegal conduct.8 5
The inherent flexibility in this approach gives the courts a significant
amount of latitude in developing restrictions on speech and expression,
especially since the Third Circuit appears willing to "find the tests" nec-
essary to uphold restrictions against the previously defined "special cat-
egory" of protesters.
The second variation involves the third element of the time, place
and manner test which requires the preservation of communication
channels. The Third Circuit's interpretation of this element is arguably
a significant divergence from the Supreme Court's approach. The lan-
guage of the Supreme Court test, which the Third Circuit closely tracked
in the beginning of its opinion, requires time, place and manner restric-
tions to leave open "ample alternative channels of communication." '86
The difference in the Third Circuit's approach is that it reads the "am-
ple" requirement out of the analysis. 8 7 This divergence is apparent in
the Third Circuit's disregard for the protester's ability to communicate
effectively within the restrictions, as well as its use of the language
describing the injunction as leaving "open alternative channels of ex-
pression."'8 8 Although Supreme Court opinions have never given a
82. For a discussion of the MeMonagle II court's discussion of the narrowly
tailored analysis, see supra note 55, infra notes 83-85 and accompanying text.
83. Frisby, 487 U.S. at 485 (emphasis added); see City Council of Los Ange-
les v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 808-10 (1984) (upholding ordinance
banning all signs on public property to preserve aesthetic interests of
community).
84. For a review of the court's analysis of the specific provisions of the in-
junction, see supra note 55.
85. McMonagle 11, 939 F.2d at 63-65. The court indicates the significance of
the defendant's past conduct at every step of the analysis. Id. at 62-65.
86. Id. at 62 (emphasis added) (quoting Frisby, 487 U.S. 474).
87. Id. at 62-65.
88. Id. at 64. Typically, a change of one word in one opinion would not
signal a complete change of approach. However, these conclusions are based on
the fact that the Third Circuit's actual application of the test appears to signal a
shift in the doctrine, and there is no indication in its opinion that it is recogniz-
ing this divergence.
A substantial portion of McMonagle's argument, although ignored by the
court, states that the injunction does not leave open alternative channels of com-
munication that are "ample." See Brief for McMonagle, supra note 26, at 18-29.
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great deal of attention to the analysis of whether alternative channels are
"ample," the opinions have shown that this factor should be considered,
and certainly not abandoned. 89 The net result of the Third Circuit's
alterations of the tests is a loosening of the analysis; making it easier, at
least in the Third Circuit, for government restrictions to be imposed.
Notwithstanding the interpretive variations, the Third Circuit has
fundamentally followed Supreme Court precedent in holding that
"time, place and manner" restrictions can be imposed on the exercise of
one's First Amendment rights as long as the restrictions are content
neutral, narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest, and
maintain alternative means of communication. 90 After Northeast Women's
Center, Inc. v. McMonagle (H), this analysis is subject to an exception in
the Third Circuit that applies to a "special category" of protesters who
are found to have a prior history of violent and illegal acts. 9 1 Although
ambiguous, the Third Circuit's application of this exception to a special
class results in a lower level of scrutiny applied to the review of injunc-
tions and other restrictive orders that infringe on a protester's First
Amendment rights. 92 Although the general holdings in this case do not
break new legal ground, the Third Circuit's interpretations have estab-
lished it as a frontrunner in the conservative trend sweeping much of the
nation's judiciary, with the result in this case being encroachment on the
First Amendment. The approach utilized by the Third Circuit indicates
its willingness to construe precedent liberally and to ensure the maxi-
mum amount of state control allowed by the Supreme Court. Finally,
the Third Circuit has also made it clear that it is prepared to uphold a
wide range of sanctions, including fines and imprisonment, to ensure
that court orders construing its interpretations are respected. 9 3
Joseph A. Yanchik, III
89. See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 802 (1989) (stating
"[t]hat the city's limitations on volume may reduce to some degree the potential
audience for respondent's speech is of no consequence, for there has been no
showing that the remaining avenues of communication are inadequate."); Frisby,
487 U.S. at 482-84 (noting that "the limited nature of the prohibition makes it
virtually self-evident that ample alternatives remain"). The Supreme Court
opinions make it clear that the adequacy of communication and expression after
a restrictive injunction is imposed must at least be considered by the reviewing
court.
90. For a discussion of the Third Circuit's analysis of these requirements
and the Supreme Court cases that established them, see supra notes 32-74 and
accompanying text.
91. For a discussion of the "special category" exception and its application
by the Third Circuit, see supra notes 39-44 and accompanying text.92. For a discussion of the potential impact on the First Amendment analy-
sis, see supra notes 82-89 and accompanying text.
93. For a discussion of the Third Circuit's approach to civil contempt reme-
dies, see supra notes 78-79 and accompanying text.
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